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ABSTRACT
This Paper seeks to examine the legal framework in which the
self-defense exception is applied in Israel in circumstances of domes-
tic violence. The Paper scrutinizes the issue with reference to recent
amendments to the Israeli Penal Code pertaining to the ‘castle-
defense’ which grants a person defending his home and property-wide
protection from criminal liability. In light of these amendments, the
lack of legislative harmony between the exception to criminal liabil-
ity applied when defending property and the deficient protection
afforded to victims of ongoing, severe domestic violence, is striking.
Aside from a critical review of Israeli legislation on the issue, this
Paper suggests an appropriate legal framework to apply the self-
defense exception in circumstances of domestic abuse. The proposal
creates legal harmony within the self-defense exceptions in Israeli
criminal law, taking the path of legislative amendments enacted re-
cently in the Australian state of Victoria, as well as several states
in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
On the afternoon of February 18, 1994, shots were heard in the
northern town of Kiryat Shmone. It emerged that Carmela Bukhbut,
a town resident, had killed her husband Yehuda.1 Thirteen years
later, at the other end of Israel, gun shots were heard in the early
hours of the morning of January 13, 2007.2 At his solitary southern
ranch, Shai Dromi had killed Khalad Abu Trash.3
Despite the geographical distance and the passage of time, the
two cases demonstrate many similarities: Shai Dromi and Carmela
Bukhbut were both charged with manslaughter and unlawful pos-
session of a firearm (Shai Dromi used a Remington rifle that belonged
to his father while Carmela Bukhbut used a Glilon rifle assigned to
her son, a soldier).4 Both parties were accused of firing the entire
magazine.5 It was noted in both cases, however, that the accused did
not empty the magazine and reload, rather, they performed a con-
tinuous, single shooting sequence that was over in an instant (in the
Bukhbut case, the rifle was set to automatic while with Dromi, the
shooting lasted about 1.5 seconds).6
In both cases, the prosecution argued that the accused did not
face a deadly threat to themselves or others (in Dromi’s case, nor
to his property) and that the decedents were, at the time of their
demise, attempting to flee the scene (or in Bukhbut’s case, a hiatus
in the confrontation).7 The courts attributed emotional turmoil, not
the homicidal intent needed to support a murder conviction, to both
instances, and noted that the decedents were not themselves inno-
cent. Dromi killed Abu Trash amidst Abu’s attempt to burglarize
and steal a flock of sheep, and Bukhbut killed her husband following
an instance of physical, verbal, emotional, and psychological abuse.8
On the other hand, the accused were described positively: Dromi
was called the “salt of the earth,” and the decedent’s brother and
father testified to Bukhbut’s noble character in light of the violence
1. CrimA (Nz) 29/49 State of Israel v. Carmela Bukhbut, PM (1994) (Isr.).
2. CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD (2009) (Isr.).
3. Id.
4. See CrimA (Nz) 29/49 State of Israel v. Carmela Bukhbut, PM (1994) (Isr.);
CrimA 6353/94 Carmela Bukhbut v. State of Israel PD (1995) (Isr.); CrimA (BS) 1010/07
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she sustained.9 In mitigation, the courts also noted that the accused
were both victims of repeated acts of violence,10 and the society and
police helplessness in uncovering preventative measures.11
Another similarity between the two cases is that they both
stirred public emotion and legal debate, which ultimately translated
into legislative proposals (Bill No. 41 and Bill No. 99) and amend-
ments to the Criminal Code (Nos. 44 and 98, respectively).12 Amend-
ment No. 44—approved following the Bukhbut incident—at best
reduces the sentence of women convicted of murder, but does not
afford any relaxation of case law requirements in the event that
they resort to self-help measures.13 Amendment No. 98, on the other
hand (the amendment adopted following the Dromi incident), grants
the individual an extended right to self-defence of his property at his
residence or place of business (on which grounds Dromi was acquitted
of the manslaughter charge brought against him).14 Despite the simi-
larities, one tragic and disturbing difference exists between the two
verdicts: Dromi was acquitted of manslaughter and went home.15
9. CrimA (Nz) 29/49 State of Israel v. Carmela Bukhbut, PM (1994) (Isr.); CrimA
(BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD (2009) (Isr.).
10. In Shai Dromi’s case, the affair was yet another break-in following many previous
ones, though not necessarily perpetrated by Abu Trash, as the identities of the perpe-
trators in the pervious burglaries were unknown. Also, with the Carmela Bukhbut affair,
this was one additional violent episode in a long and continuous saga of aggression on
behalf of her husband, Yehuda Bukhbut. See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi
PD (2009) (Isr.); CrimA (Nz) 29/49 State of Israel v. Carmela Bukhbut, PM (1994) (Isr.).
11. The Supreme Court Justices said of Carmela Bukhbut: “[I]n the small settlement
in which she lived it was an open secret. Her husband’s parents, his brother, sisters and
the environment, all knew of it but remained silent. She walked around like a shadow,
carrying the marks of abuse on her body and face, never smiling.” CrimA 6353/94
Carmela Bukhbut v. The State of Israel PD 647 (1995) (Isr.). In the case of Shai Dromi,
the District Court Justices said: “[T]o understand the occurrence of the event which is
the subject matter of these charges, I f ind it appropriate to start with the testimony of
the Accused, in so far as it relates to the story of the ‘Shem Farm’ and life there . . . the
realisation of the dream wrapped up in significant daily existential hardship, taking
account of the war of survival and continuous confrontation with waves of violent intru-
sions that only got worse over time. The Accused further related, that above and beyond
this suffering he was forced to deal with the executive authority’s—the Israeli Police
Force—inability, according to his claim, to eradicate or minimise this wave of violence,
being helpless.” See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD 19 (2009) (Isr.).
12. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5755-1995, HH No. 41 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amend-
ing the Penal Code, 5786-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 99 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the
Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995, HH No. 44 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending
the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 98 (Isr.).
13. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995, HH
No. 44 (Isr.)
14. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH
No. 98 (Knesset).
15. See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD (2009) (Isr.).
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Bukhbut, on the other hand, was convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to seven years in prison.16
The empirical comparison of the two incidents in this Article is
intended principally to illustrate the extant difficulties in the appli-
cation of the doctrine of self-defence to the cases of battered women.
For this reason, this Article shall not deal with circumstances in which
the state fails to adequately fulfill its role to defend the life and
property of its citizens,17 even though the issues are likely deserving
of a separate discussion. Similarly, and for argumentative reasons,
the comparison of the legislative amendments brought about by these
two cases, with specific references to Amendment No. 98 (the castle-
defence), is principally intended to illustrate the present willingness
of the legislator to relax the traditional requirements for applying
the self-defence exception in unique circumstances and to infer from
that the requisite comparable relaxation in the context of domestic
abuse. Though the comparison of the two cases raises additional,
general questions in relation to exceptions to criminal liability, this
Article shall focus on self-defence and particularly the self-defence
of battered women as an exception to criminal liability in Israel. The
second part of the Paper will offer a draft proposal to amend the
Criminal Code and to adapt the self-defence exception appropriately
to the circumstances surrounding domestic violence.
I. THE SELF-DEFENCE EXCEPTION IN THE CRIMINAL CODE
The right of the individual to defend himself in certain circum-
stances by action taken to repel an assault is ingrained in the origin
of the doctrine of self-defence in Israel.18 Such defence is labeled as
“self” defence because the action is not taken by the authorities
charged with the protection of public order, but rather by a defen-
dant himself.19 The general legislative anchor is to be found in Basic
16. Following appeal to the Supreme Court, the sentence was reduced to three years
imprisonment. CrimA 6353/94 Carmela Bukhbut v. The State of Israel PD (1995) (Isr.)
(Justice Kedmi, dissenting, that the seven-year sentence should not be reduced).
17. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 8–9 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
Dover Publications, Inc. 2003) (1762) (regarding the social compact between the individual
and the state).
18. As with the defence of necessity, a person acts in this defence “not out of a fighting
spirit but because the action was forced upon him.” A. Anker & R. Kanai, Defence and
Necessity Following Amendment No. 37 of the Penal Code, Plilim C’ 8 (1993). See S.Z.
Pheler, Punitive Law Foundations Part B 372, 414–21 (1987).
19. See Pheler, supra note 18.
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Law: Dignity and Freedom of the Individual.20 More specifically, the
doctrine of self-defence is codified in Section 34 of the Israeli Penal
Code,21 which pretty much follows the wording and legal interpreta-
tion of the doctrine in common law. A review of the past legislative
proposals (Bills Nos. 45, 41, 38 & 99) and Penal Code amendments
(Nos. 37, 39, 44 & 98) reveals a growing tendency of the Israeli legisla-
tor to extend the exceptions to criminal liability insofar as they
relate to the self-defence privilege.22
This expansionary tendency of the self-defence exception was ex-
pressly stated in Amendment 37 of the Penal Code,23 which refers to
self-defence as an important sociopolitical value24 worthy of a complete
lack of apologetic tone.25 Therefore, in circumstances of individual
defence, “one does not require an exemption from criminal liability,”
20. The law states in Section 2 that “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or
dignity of any person as such”; Section 3 states that “[t]here shall be no violation of the
property of a person”; and Section 4 states that “[a]ll persons are entitled to protection
of their life, body and dignity.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH
No. 1391, § 2 (Isr.).
21. Penal Code, 5737-1977, SH No. 5737 § 34 (Isr.) (“No person shall incur criminal
liability for an act that was immediately required to repel an unlawful attack that carried
real danger to his own life, limb or property or to that of another; however, a person does
not act in self-defence where he brought about the attack by his own misconduct foreseeing
the possibility of how events may unfold.”).
22. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code 5755-1995, HH No. 45 (Isr.); Draft Bill
Amending the Penal Code, 5755-1995, HH No. 41 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal
Code 5751-1991, HH No. 38 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5786-2008, HH
(Knesset) No. 99 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments),
5752-1992, HH No. 37 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amend-
ments), 5754-1994, HH No. 39 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative
Amendments), 5755-1995, HH No. 44 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legis-
lative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH No. 98 (Knesset).
23. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5752-1992, HH
No. 37 (Isr.); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 1571-1991, No. 232 (Isr.). The Bill was
proposed in 1991 by a group of parliamentarians from right wing parties in the back-
ground of the Intifada during which the Arab population of the territories occupied by
Israel in 1967 rose up in rebellion. The Amendment was approved in 1992. Id.
24. On this matter, member of parliament MK Levin argued: “Exercising the right
to self-defence is a prime social value, and one cannot start from the premise that the
person bares [sic] criminal liability from which he may be excused. Instead, one must
state clearly: he bares [sic] no criminal liability.” MK Oriel Lin, Israeli Member of Parlia-
ment, Parliamentary Debate (Mar. 16, 1992). Moreover, he added: “The whole approach
as if he is liable and committed a criminal offence and that he is being treated here with
mercy and exempted from punishment is utterly wrong. He is a person who did something
of great value to society, for without the right to self-defence, no [society] in the world
may exist.” Id.
25. A tone which accompanied the retrospective excuse given only once the criminal
classif ication of the attack was removed by the court in recognition of the act as a de-
fending act, namely as “Self-Defence.” The amendment therefore replaced such legal
approach of ‘retrospective excuse’ with an approach that considers the idea of self defence
as ‘justified’ in principle. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amend-
ments), 5752-1992, HH No. 37 (Isr.).
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but rather “one does not incur criminal liability at all.” 26 Moreover,
Amendment 37 extended the scope of the exception,27 relaxed the
requirements for its application,28 and granted the courts authority
to reduce the mandatory sentence prescribed by statute.29
However, notwithstanding the Israeli legislator’s expansionary
trend, the courts continue to carefully examine the existence of six
requirements prior to excusing a defendant from criminal liability30:
26. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5752-1992,
HH No. 37 (Isr.).
27. Application of the self-defence exception was extended so that it applies not only
to a person’s right to save those “who are under his protection” but also to a person’s
right to defend any other person, be they who they may. Draft Bill Amending the Penal
Code (Legislative Amendments), 5752-1992, HH No. 37 (Isr.). For that reason, the original
version: “injury to his person, dignity or property, or to the person of others who are under
his protection” was replaced with: “danger to his own life, limb or property or that of
another.” Id. This approach, which exists in Hebraic law in the duty “nor shall you stand
by idly when your neighbor’s life is at stake” was extended and codified following Penal
Code Amendment Bill No. 45. Leviticus 19:16 (The New American); Draft Bill Amending
the Penal Code 5755-1995, HH No. 45 (Isr.); Thou Shall Not Stand Aside When Mischief
Befalls Thy Neighbour Act, 5758-1998, SH No. 1670 § 1(A) (Isr.) (containing a duty to
rescue and assist in these words: “A person is under a duty to assist another who, in front
of his very eyes, owing to a sudden event, is in severe and immediate danger to his life, his
bodily integrity or his health, when such assistance is within his power, without taking
any risk himself or endangering another.”).
28. From the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) debates it seems that they probably felt there
was no need to elaborate especially on the requirements for the application of the self-de-
fence privilege, both by reason of the desire to extend the defence and to grant the courts
a zone of discretion. See MK Dan Meridor, Israeli Member of Parliament, Knesset Debate
(March 3, 1992), http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/SessionItem.aspx?item
ID=160518 [https://perma.cc/9BMH4JQ2] (“[S]uch a proposal can certainly fit in the ap-
proach taken by the Supreme Court.” ). Also, the defence applies by definition only in the
event that an active attack already took place. Id. (using the term “to repel an attack”).
29. The amendment granted the courts the authority to reduce the sentence in cases
in which the defence could not be applied by reason of the accused having “deviated from
the confines of reasonableness in the circumstances.” See Draft Bill Amending the Penal
Code (Legislative Amendments), 5752-1992, HH No. 37 § 22 (B) (Isr.). This amendment
in fact incorporated the idea that was earlier proposed in the Penal Code Amendment
No. 38. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code 5751-1991, HH No. 38 (Isr.). Penal Code
Amendment 249 granted the Courts “discretion as to the appropriate punishment, when
a person acts subjectively to defend himself . . . but objectively it is held that his conduct
did not meet the requirements of the law.” Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code 5451-
1991, HH No. 249 (Isr.). The proposal gave the judges authority to weigh subjective and
substantive facets that were unique to the circumstances and that would justify deviation
from the principle of mandatory punishment. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code 5751-
1991, HH No. 38 § 22(B) (Isr.) (“If the Court concludes that a person committed an offence
that carries a mandatory sentence pursuant to Sections 22 & 22A, but that he must be
criminally liable for having exceeded in his conduct the confines of reasonableness in the
circumstances to prevent danger or because the damage or injury which he inflicted were
out of proportion vis-à-vis the damage or injury which he sought to prevent, the Court
is entitled to not impose the mandatory sentence, but rather a more lenient one.”).
30. See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD 5–7 (2009) (Isr.); see also
CrimA 8133/09 Shahar Mizrachi v. State of Israel, PM 5771 669, 676 (2010) (Isr.).
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1. Lack of aggression in the actor’s defending action;
2. The defending action being immediate;
3. Danger to the defending actor being tangible;
4. Reasonableness of the defending action (the conse-
quences of the defending action cannot outweigh the
consequences they were intended to prevent);
5. The defending action being the less harmful alterna-
tive, including the duty to retreat whenever possible;
6. Lack of prior misconduct on behalf the defender.31
II. THE SELF-DEFENCE EXCEPTION—THE CASE OF
CARMELA BUKHBUT
The rationale underlying these requirements seems to ensure
the preservation of law and order, but an operative gender-based ex-
amination reveals that laying down these requirements creates a
depressing, exasperating reality for women in general, and battered
women in particular.32 Five out of the six requirements do not fit the
social-cultural-educational foundation that defines the typical behav-
iour of women, let alone women in circumstances of domestic abuse.33
For instance, abused women react uniquely at a stage of quiet
appeasement or when the immediate danger has subsided.34 Such
delayed reaction does not correspond to case law requirements of
immediacy and repelling an attack, even though a requirement to
react to the aggressor immediately is impossible or would intensify
the violence perpetrated against her.35 A narrow, legalistic, concrete
examination of the events surrounding the murder (detached from
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in
the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R-C.L. REV. 623, 623, 629 (1980); see also Stephanie
M. Wildman, Ending Male Privilege: Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1797, 1797–98 (2000); see also R. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
3 (1988); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMAN’S DEVELOPMENT 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1982); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 34 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987).
33. See Schneider, supra note 32, at 629–31, 633–36 (describing social stereotypes about
women, particularly misconceptions regarding battered women, and traditional require-
ments of self-defense, including reasonable defensive force and risk of imminent harm).
34. M.J. Willoughby, Comment, Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a Battered
Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 U. KAN. L. REV.
169, 184, 191 (1989).
35. Therefore, “[t]he woman chooses to defend herself at a time she feels less threat-
ened, in the intervals between the cycles of violence.” See Emanuel Gross, The Battered
Wife—Is It Not Time For The Criminal Law To Protect Her?, The Praklit 112 (1998);
Barak-Erez, The Reasonable Woman, Plilim F 124 (1997); Schneider, supra note 32, at 634.
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the cumulative, cyclical and fatal dynamic of domestic violence) leads
to the erroneous conclusion that it was neither reasonable nor justifi-
able to respond with deadly force because the woman faced no immedi-
ate, objective danger.36 The legal consequence of such a conclusion
is that the woman’s reaction is categorised as an act of aggression, and
therefore, a criminal offence.37
Especially disturbing is the requirement to retreat.38 This re-
quirement causes many to question why battered women do not
leave.39 Sadly, a woman remaining with an abusive partner testifies
more to the difficulties associated with the option to abandon (inter
alia, concern for children, economic dependency, lack of alternatives,
the authorities’ helplessness and more), than it does to a woman’s
positive choice to remain.40 It is also surprising that retreat is a re-
quirement even though it is known that the abused woman’s retreat
from the scene does not prevent a continuation of the attack. Rather,
it only postpones it,41 and at times at the price of exacerbating it.42
Moreover, it is important to remember that the requirement to re-
treat when directed at battered women is at odds with the fact that
the “scene” is her home. Such a requirement in itself constitutes an
affront to a woman’s basic right to live in a home of her own as of
right and not by the grace of others; it is therefore inappropriate to
revoke this right, even though the scene is property shared with the
same person attacking her.43 Since a similar recognition of such
legal right already has been expressed in Israel, there, nothing is to
36. Schneider, supra note 32, at 634.
37. Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident
on Behalf of Battered Woman Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 31 (1986).
38. Id. at 29 n.106 (noting that escape may not be a realistic option).
39. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMAN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 77 (2000).
40. Id. at 77–79; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1991); see, e.g., Bilski Leora, Battered
Women: From Self Defence to Defending The Self, Plilim F, 5, 23–24 (5759-1997).
41. See, e.g., R. A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Bat-
terers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 392–93 (1993) (noting one victim’s lack of a realistic alternative
to killing her batterer); see also Gross, supra note 35, at 120. In the general context of such
a requirement Pheler argues that retreat cannot be demanded where it may increase the
exposure of the attacked person to the assailant’s attack, or when such a requirement
“only shifts the location of the assault with the retreat from the scene, and perhaps its
timing, (but) does nothing to prevent the assault itself.” See Pheler, supra note 18, at 430.
42. See Mahoney, supra note 40, at 58 (noting that a woman threatening to leave a
relationship can be extremely dangerous for the battered woman).
43. Thomas Katheder, Case Note, Criminal Law—Lovers and Other Strangers: Or,
When Is A House A Castle?—Privilege of Non-Retreat in the Home Held Inapplicable to
Legal Co-Occupants—State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
465, 473 (1983) (explaining that a preponderance of states f ind the “privilege of non-
retreat available regardless of ” co-occupancy of a residence by the victim and batterer).
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prevent such aligned recognition from being applied in the context
of defensive acts of abused women.44
Sadly, in Carmela Bukhbut’s case, the District Court ruled out
self-defence and held: “we are not dealing with a case of self-defence
during an aggressive incident, neither should this case be viewed as
provocation, objectively or subjectively, as that term is defined in
law.” 45 Somewhat differently, when hearing the appeal against the
sentence, the Supreme Court held that the case could be viewed as
one of “ongoing provocation.” 46 Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner,
who recognised the legal doctrine of “ongoing provocation,” noted in
her judgement:
First of all, the special severity and unnumbered incidents of
abusive acts perpetrated by the decedent on his wife, the Appel-
lant, cannot be ignored. There was apparently an intensive se-
quence of beatings, including injuring of the Appellant with
various implements, and terror, intimidation and humiliation,
worse than which can barely be imagined . . . the beatings that
the husband inflicted on the Appellant adjacent to the shooting do
not support provocation of themselves. However, in legal litera-
ture and English common law, the concept of provocation based
upon the cumulative affect of violence, which causes the victim
to erupt, is recognised.47
Though the recognition of “ongoing provocation” did not excuse
Carmela from criminal liability, it is appropriate for its poetic justice.
Such recognition exposed and displayed Yehuda Bukhbut’s violent
deeds in the court’s proceedings, thus turning the spotlight some-
what to a more proper discussion of the deceased’s actions’ cardinal
contribution to the unfortunate result before the courts (which re-
sulted in his absence from the legal hearing in his matter).
The District Court Justices also claimed that Bukhbut “deviated
in her actions beyond the bounds of reasonableness.” 48 One of the
most difficult problems often faced by applying the exception from
criminal liability to the actions of a battered woman is her use of a
deadly weapon against the husband who usually hits and injures
her with his fists or with the use of non-deadly home instruments.49
44. See Prevention of Domestic Violence Act § 2, 5751-1991 (Isr.) (allowing for an
injured partner to be protected in their home even if the aggressive partner has rights
in the same property).
45. CrimA (Nz) 29/49 State of Israel v. Carmela Bukhbut, PM 277 (1994) (Isr.).
46. CrimA 6353/94 Carmela Bukhbut v. State of Israel PD (1995) (Isr.).
47. Id.
48. CrimA (Nz) 29/49 State of Israel v. Carmela Bukhbut, PM 277 (1994) (Isr.).
49. Id.
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Though case law’s reasonableness requirement aims to prevent the
further escalation of violence, it is inappropriate to strictly demand
such a requirement within circumstances of predetermined inequal-
ity, in which the attacked woman is not only weaker but also lacks
experience in exchanging blows.50
The requirement that the accused make out a case of tangible
life-threatening circumstances is highly problematic in the context
of abused women. The threat to their lives does not emanate from a
single or incidental transient event, but rather from a permanent sub-
jective feeling fixed by reason of the unique, violent circumstances
in which they live.51 Also, from an objective point of view, the tangible
danger is not necessarily to be found in the events surrounding the
killing (which are deemed relevant to the judicial decision). Rather,
the tangible danger is in the gradual escalation and the endless
cycle of violence.52 Thus, even though it is not always possible to pin-
point a critical, acute event leading to the battered woman’s reac-
tion, the view that this is a passing danger that may not materialize
must be doubted and disputed, to say the very least.53
Ultimately and lamentably, the abovementioned incongruence
between the current law (along with the traditional requirements of
precedent) and the characteristic response of battered women, car-
ries obvious fateful legal consequences. Women who carry out the
characteristic reaction in such circumstances shall be convicted of
manslaughter (if not murder) and be imprisoned for lengthy custodial
sentences in spite of the saga of torment which afflicts their lives.54
III. SELF-DEFENCE IN THE SHAI DROMI CASE
The Israeli legislator has, of late, significantly relaxed the re-
quirements set down by case law in relation to the defence of property
50. Gross, supra note 35, at 114; Barak-Erez, supra note 35, at 122 (arguing that when
dealing with a predetermined power imbalance “the use of a deadly weapon may be a nec-
essary default option”); see also A. McColgan, In defence of Battered Women Who Kill, 13
OXFORD J. OF L. STUDIES, 508, 524 (1993).
51. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55 (1979) (describing the cycles of out-
burst and escalation of violence to female spouses.).
52. On the necessity to view the entire saga of abuse and violence as relevant to the
examination of the immediate background of the assault event; see also D. Nicolson &
R. Sanghui, More Justice for the Battered Woman, 146 NEW. L. J. 1122 (1995).
53. Since “paying attention to past experience [from which] it must be learnt that the
opposite is in fact true, meaning, the probability of the threat being exercised is absolute
and certain.” Gross, supra note 35, at 110; see also McColgan, supra note 50, at 508–29.
54. Even if they receive a more lenient sentence under Section 300a(c), which allows
for the imposition of a lighter sentence than life imprisonment for murder. See infra
Section IV.
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in one’s residence.55 Penal Code Amendment Number 98,56 also known
as “The Dromi Act” or the “castle-defence,” expressly prescribes spe-
cial treatment for a residence and extends the right of a person to
defend his property not only in his home but also at his business or
agricultural farm.57 The Amendment constitutes part of a trend by
the Israeli legislator to broaden the right to self-defence in general,58
and to protect the agricultural sector in particular.59
When we incorporate the judicial interpretation given in the
Dromi case into the words of the castle-defence amendment, it is
apparent that the amendment in its entirety (including the judicial
interpretation) only left three of the six traditional legal require-
ments for exemption from criminal liability on a claim of self-de-
fence. The remaining legal requirements include: the defending
action being immediate and of a repelling nature and there having
been no prior misconduct on the defender’s behalf.60 On the other
hand, the Amendment relaxed (or repealed) the defender’s require-
ment to have been in tangible danger, to have attempted to avoid
the attack by retreating, and to have chosen a reasonable defending
action.61 It should be emphasised that the legislator ultimately
55. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No 98 (Isr.).
56. Id. (adding the self-defence of a residence, known as the “castle-defence,” as a
separate clause) (“34J (1) (a) No person shall incur criminal liability for any act that was
immediately required in order to repel an intruder or person who entered a residence,
business or fenced agricultural farm, belonging to him, or to another, with the intention
of committing a crime, or a person attempting to so intrude or enter. (b) The provisions
of the forgoing subsection (a) shall not apply if—(1) the act was clearly unreasonable, in
the circumstances, to repel the intruder or enterer; (2) the person brought about the
intrusion or entry by his own misconduct, foreseeing the possibility that events would
unfold. (c) For these purposes, ‘Agricultural Farm’, including pasture and area used to
store equipment and vehicles on an agricultural farmstead.”).
57. See Boaz Sangero, Shall the Justification Turn into an Excuse by Favour?
Defending a Residence (“The Dromi Act” and Judgement in the Dromi Case) as a Test
Case of the Rationale Justifying Self-Defence and Israeli Case Law, Mishpat VeMimshal
13, 93, 121 (2011) (critiquing this expansion of self-defence).
58. See infra Section V.
59. A trend which received expression in the bills and amendments intended to assist
the agricultural sector in coping with repeated thefts. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal
Code, 5756-1995, HH No. 46 (Isr.) (containing a stiffening of punitive measures for cattle
and livestock theft); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5728-2008, HH (Gov.) No. 100
(Isr.) (aggravating the classif ication of the offence of theft above a certain value from a
misdemeanour to a crime, inter alia, in order to provide “adequate response to the theft
of agricultural equipment and infrastructure.”); Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code,
5768-2007, HH (Knesset) No. 97 (making an attempt to cope with the thefts in the agri-
cultural sector by doubling the fixed sentence set down by law for theft of agricultural
produce and equipment from two to four years, thus equalizing the punishment with the
rate set in Amendment No. 46 in relation to theft of cattle and livestock).
60. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH
(Knesset) No. 98.
61. Id.
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chose to explicitly relax only one of the case law requirements for
the application of the castle-defence: the “element of reasonableness.”
Therefore, the legislator was willing to apply the exception from
criminal liability to those who also exceeded the boundaries of rea-
sonableness in their reaction, provided that the act was not “clearly
unreasonable in the circumstances.” 62 However, viewed in light of
its concomitant judicial interpretation, the Amendment eventually
relaxed the requirements of such self-defence over and above that
which were precisely and expressly intended and approved by the
legislator.63 In this context, the Dromi court softened and relieved
the castle-defence requirements, while further relaxing the reading
of two other requirements in Amendment Number 98. The following
requirements appeared in the first version of the bill,64 but were not
adopted by the legislator: the repeal/relaxation of the duty to retreat
(in so far as the attack takes place in the defender’s residence),65 and
the legal determination of an irrebuttable presumption of real risk
of injury to life and limb in the case of a residential intrusion.66
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Note that Amendment No. 98 ultimately approved the less radical version of the
original Bill. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 99,
Version B. Even though Amendment No. 98 creates a new self-defence in connection with
the self-defence of the home and business (the castle-defence), it does not state anything
expressly in relation to the repeal of two requirements of case law: the requirement to
retreat and the requirement of being in imminent danger. Id. The first version of the bill
(that later was not approved), proposed that Section 34(J) be marked (a), and after it
shall be inserted: “(b) in the event that the assault was an intrusion or entry to a resi-
dence with the intention to commit an offence, the person being attacked shall be deemed
as he, or anyone with him, were facing a real threat to their life or limb, unless proven
otherwise.” Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 99,
Version A. Section 2 of that same version proposes an amendment pursuant to which
Section 34O will be marked (a) and after it shall be inserted: “(b) in the application of Sec-
tion 34J, a person’s deeds shall not be construed as unreasonable in the circumstances,
solely for the reason that he failed to retreat from his residence.” Id.
65. See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD 9–10 (2009) (Isr.) (“It is true
that in the Bill . . . when two versions of the proposed legislation were presented, even-
tually version A was not approved . . . but it is still possible to deduce from the version
enacted, that broadened the protection of a person being attacked in his own home, the
legislator’s intention to fortify a person’s status in his own home, not only by not
requiring the person to retreat from his home . . . but that he would be entitled . . . to
commit action to repel the intruder . . . even though the Israeli legislator did not literally
and explicitly void or null the duty to retreat under circumstances of repelling an intruder
in his home, the intention of the legislator is clear and unequivocal from the wording of
the Act and from the purpose of the Amendment as it transpires from the Bill’s explanatory
remarks, and its professional parliamentary discussions in the Constitution, Law and
Justice Parliamentary Committee.”).
66. It is possible that the judicial interpretation of the presumption of real danger
relies not only on the unapproved version of the bill, but also on the wording of the
amendment itself, which applies the claim of self-defence also to the mere attempt to
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Combining the legislator’s wording of the castle-defence both with
its judicial interpretation and with its abovementioned predominant
inclination to male behavioural patterns, we may consequently and
bitterly conclude that Israeli self-defence doctrine corresponds al-
most exclusively with male behavioural patterns.67 Indeed, current
requirements extensively exempt men from criminal liability in
general, and men defending their property in particular, but do not
afford similar considerable exemptions when addressing women in
general, and battered women in particular.68 If only for the sake of
legal harmony, a parallel and somewhat similar doctrinal flexibility
is justified. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a justified adap-
tation of the self-defence doctrine, with regard to the unique and ex-
cruciating circumstances of domestic violence.
IV. SELF-DEFENCE LEGISLATION IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CIRCUMSTANCES
The original Bill (Amendment Number 41 to the Penal Code) set
forth limitations to the determination of homicide in circumstances
of diminished responsibility, and in fact actually removed certain
acts from the ambit of the offence of murder.69 The proposed legisla-
tion suggested the imposition of reduced criminal liability on anyone
committing homicide under circumstances of extreme distress close
to, but not coincident with, insanity, self-defence or necessity, or in
other situations of extreme hardship.70 Thus, rather than imposing
complete and absolute liability on a person who committed murder,
the Bill offered partial and limited excuse.71 Especially relevant to
our issue is the clause that permits diminished responsibility “in
enter the residence. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5768-2008, HH (Knesset)
No. 98 (adding as a requirement: “with the intention to commit an offence, or a person
attempting to so intrude or enter.” ). See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD
12 (2009) (Isr.) (“The legislator saw fit to further and broaden the right of a person to
defend his body and property in his home from burglars or persons attempting to break
into his premises. Thus, even if the burglary was not accompanied by an assault on the
homeowner, the action would be deemed as if it were an assault, even if the burglary itself
did not constitute a real threat to the life of the person possessing . . . it can therefore be
deduced, from this provision, that the actual break in to his home exposes the possessor
to the possibility of real danger to his life and property, all the more so should he seek
to defend his property, since then he could be exposed to danger to his person, even
though initially the burglar did not intend to injure the body of the person attacked.”).
67. See Schnieder, supra note 32, at 635–36 (discussing the conceptually masculine
foundation of the legal doctrine of self-defence).
68. Id.
69. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5755-1995, HH No. 41 (Isr.).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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circumstances of severe emotional distress, owing to severe abuse,
directed at him or a member of his family, by the victim of the of-
fence.”72 MP Libai, who presented the Bill on behalf of the government
to the Israeli Parliament, said in this context:
The Bill expresses a principled opinion, that a person who is
caught up in one of the very difficult circumstances detailed in
it and as a result kills another, does not stand in the same moral
category as a murderer. That’s why justice demands that he not
be convicted of murder, with all the social stigma accompanying
such a conviction, and the Court passing sentence upon him being
required of necessity to impose a life sentence . . . diminished
responsibility applies, under the proposed Bill, also to killing under
circumstances of emotional distress, in which a person is trapped
as a result of abuse suffered at the hands of a relative, whom he
killed. Our intention is mainly directed at the abused partner who
reaches, in extreme despair, a point where he kills the abusing
partner. In relation to women, the literature used to name their
emotional condition “Battered Wife Syndrome”. The law does not
currently deal with those types of circumstances . . . the legisla-
tive proposal expresses a social stance according to which, even
though the relative should not be absolved of liability for killing
his relative, even when he seriously abused him, justice, as men-
tioned, senses that he should not necessarily be convicted of mur-
der, and the Court should be allowed, when passing sentence, to
take into consideration the grave circumstances that brought
him to do the terrible deed which he did.73
Lamentably, the original bill that was intended to grant dimin-
ished criminal responsibility to Carmela Bukhbut and other hard-
pressed battered women in similar circumstances was not enacted.
In its place, the legislator adopted Penal Code Amendment Number
44 which prescribes, by Section 300(a)(c), that:
Notwithstanding the determination of Section 300, a lighter sen-
tence may be imposed from the sentence prescribed therein, if
the offence was committed whilst the accused was under condi-
tions of severe emotional hardship, owing to severe and ongoing
abuse committed upon him or a member of his family, by the
person whose death the accused had caused.74
72. Id. § 301.a(4).
73. MP Libai, Minister of Justice, Parliamentary debates of Amendment Bill No. 41
(Diminished Responsibility), Address Before Israeli Parliament (Knesset) (Aug. 1, 1995).
74. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995, HH
No. 44 (Isr.).
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In fact, the approved amendment rejected the notion of “diminished
responsibility” and settled for “reduced sentence,” for which the court
could impose a lighter sentence than the punishment prescribed by
law.75 The Chairman of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Commit-
tee explained during the parliamentary debates why the notion of
“diminished responsibility” was rejected, saying:
The Committee was unanimous in its decision, exclusively from
a moral point of view, that, firstly, we do not accept the notion
of diminished responsibility . . . a situation of diminished respon-
sibility gives the wrong signal, one unwanted by society. When
a person kills another, when he takes his life, we are unwilling
to accept the notion of diminished responsibility, but we all ac-
cepted the idea of reduced sentence . . . all of us, religious and
secular, right and left, who participated in the drafting of the law,
were unwilling to deviate from this moral-cultural-educational
statement, according to which for murder a person be sentenced
to life imprisonment.76
The compromised amendment that was eventually enacted does
make it possible to impose a lighter sentence on such female defen-
dants than those prescribed by law.77 Alongside the reduction in
sentence, however, such an amendment leaves intact the accompa-
nying disgrace of a murder conviction. The difference between
“diminished responsibility” and “diminished sentence” is therefore
not a semantic one but a perplexing and troubling one. An act that
only allows for a reduced sentence means a conviction for murder,
with all that that entails: a lengthy sentence, social stigma, and
criminal disgrace.78
75. The amendment ultimately approved was harsher also in the context of the ap-
propriate circumstances for imposing a lighter sentence. See Draft Bill Amending the
Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995, HH No. 44 (Isr.). It did not settle for
circumstances of “severe abuse,” as was proposed in the earlier draft of the law Draft.
Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5755-1995, HH No. 41 (Isr.). Instead it adopted a stricter
requirement of a double test consisting of “severe and ongoing abuse.” Draft Bill Amending
the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995, HH No. 44 (Isr.).
76. MK David Zucker, Words of the Chairman of the Constitution, Law & Justice
Parliamentary Committee, Address Before the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) Following
Approval in the Committee (Aug. 1, 1995).
77. A recent narrowing judicial trend can be discerned from a recent judgement
requiring the addition of an immediate causal link (at the level of motive), between the
ongoing abuse and the murder itself, in order to apply Amendment No. 44 that allows
imposition of a lighter sentence. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative
Amendments), 5755-1995, HH No. 44 (Isr.). The Supreme Court rejected a petition for
an additional hearing of this new requirement in the context of domestic abuse. CrimA
1855/05 Frishkin v. State of Israel, PM 5768 (2008) (Isr.).
78. Indeed in the context of the criminal disgrace which these woman are left with,
Member of Parliament MK Yael Dayan (who served at that time as a member of the
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Even if the proposals of the Team to Reform Homicide Offences
in Israel were to be accepted,79 the distressing legislative state of
affairs with regard to battered women would still remain. The team’s
proposals in the context of domestic violence suggest the restoration
of the original legislative bill from 1995 (which, for example, settles
for the diminished criminal responsibility of such defendants).80 The
proposals relate to a homicide performed “under severe emotional
distress owing to severe and ongoing abuse inflicted upon him or a
member of his family, by the person whose death the accused had
caused.” 81 The team’s recommendation as it pertains to battered
women relates homicide under circumstances of diminished respon-
sibility82 to a clause which describes situations that, though they fall
under the definition of murder, are worthy to be treated as homicide
under diminished responsibility83 because they encompass a lesser
degree of guilt. In fact, such recommendations would change the title
from diminished sentence to diminished criminal liability, while leav-
ing untouched the current wording of Section 300(a)(c) as was en-
acted by a compromise following the 1995 Bill.84
This means that the core improvement offered in the team’s
proposal pertains, at most, to a semantic change while leaving the
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in the Israeli Parliament) sought to circumscribe
the position presented by the chairman of the committee. MK Yael Dayan, Israeli Member
of Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Aug. 1, 1995) (“I want to remind the committee
chairman that I was in the minority. We were not unanimous in deciding on diminished
responsibility as opposed to reduce [sic] sentence. I agree that murder is murder is
murder, but I nevertheless was of the opinion that there are cases in which the stigma of
a murderer is inappropriate and I refer to the example given over and again of Carmella
Bukhbut. Under the new statute, in similar cases of prolonged abuse, they shall receive
a lighter sentence, but since diminished responsibility was not approved in the committee,
they shall remain murderers as the judge will have discretion only with regard to imposing
a lighter sentence. I was, and still am, of the opinion that diminished responsibility does
exist in cases of extreme distress and therefore also the stigma of a murderer should
correspond to the lighter sentence.”).
79. See REPORT OF THE TEAM FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF HOMI-
CIDE OFFENCES, JERUSALEM (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE TEAM ] (proposing, in
relation to the offences of murder and manslaughter, inter alia, to create two categories
for the offense of murder—basic murder and murder in aggravated circumstances—and
three offences of homicide: homicide in circumstances of diminished responsibility, reck-
less homicide and homicide at the request of the victim).
80. Which, as mentioned, was raised in the Carmella Bukhbut incident but was not
approved. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code, 5755-1995, HH No. 41 (Isr.).
81. REPORT OF THE TEAM, supra note 79, at 34.
82. REPORT OF THE TEAM, supra note 79, at 30–39.
83. A lesser degree of guilt, owing to circumstances relating to the act or the perpe-
trator. This section includes f ive acts of homicide determined as worthy of a lesser
liability: homicide under provocation, while mentally disturbed, while slightly deviating
from the standard of reasonableness, with indifference, and as mentioned in this Article’s
case: with severe emotional distress owing to abuse.
84. REPORT OF THE TEAM, supra note 79.
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overall essential legal position almost untouched,85 or at best, slightly
improved. After all, both legal extenuations offered by the men-
tioned reform already exist within the prosecution’s routine handling
of such legal cases86 (no murder convictions87 and no mandatory life
sentences, for example).88 Hence, the proposed reform delivers no
significant message of hope to battered women. Furthermore, even
according to the extenuated reform recommendations, a criminal
conviction shall continue to be recorded with both its lengthy sentence
of twenty years and its criminal disgrace, alongside its emotional and
social consequences.89 After all is said and done, such proposals would
do nothing to rectify the irritating flaws in the doctrine of self-defence
in circumstances of domestic violence. Nor do the proposals address
the lack of legislative harmony between the different requirements
applied in the castle-defence exception and the exemption of crimi-
nal liability on the ground of self-defence in circumstances of domes-
tic violence.
Indeed, the juristic query of exceptions to criminal liability in
this context is undoubtedly complex, but a more appropriate legal
85. The slight improvement is due to the legal proposal to classify the offense as man-
slaughter (with diminished responsibility), instead of murder (with reduced sentence).
86. The prosecution usually f inds it diff icult to prove in such circumstances pre-
meditation (the element necessary in order to convict for murder pursuant to the Israeli
criminal code), and therefore tends to charge with the offense of manslaughter from the
outset. Similarly, with mandatory life imprisonment for murder: current legal conditions
in Israel (made possible, as mentioned, following Penal Code Amendment No. 44) enable
deviation from mandatory life sentence for the offence of murder in circumstances of
prolonged severe abuse, so that in actual fact such defendants do not face the risk of life
imprisonment. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-
1995, HH No. 44 (Isr.).
87. As mentioned, according to the reform recommendations there will be two cate-
gories for a murder conviction: murder with mens rea of intent or indifference for which
the maximum punishment of a life sentence will be imposed, and the offence of murder
in aggravated circumstances on account of which the court may, in certain circumstances,
exercise discretion not to impose a mandatory life sentence.
88. The reform team was aware of the criticism passed on the inflexibility of a manda-
tory life sentence for murder, especially in cases “and in actions that existed in special
circumstances that do not morally f it the same degree as typical acts of murder.” REPORT
OF THE TEAM, supra note 79, at 30. The reform team was of the opinion that a mandatory
life sentence for murder offences that almost cannot be deviated from is punishment that
does not allow for flexibility and decision making according to the specif ic circumstances
of the case, and thus at times does not fit the level of guilt of the deed. Id. The team
recommended, therefore, to untie the judges’ hands in relation to the appropriate punish-
ment for murder. Id.
89. The reform team was split on the issue of the maximum sentence appropriate for
homicide in circumstances of diminished responsibility. The Prosecution Service and rep-
resentatives of the legislation and advisory department were of the opinion that the
appropriate maximum sentence is 20 years, whereas the Public Defender’s Off ice was
of the opinion that the appropriate maximum sentence would be 15 years. One way or the
other it is a lengthy custodial sentence. REPORT OF THE TEAM, supra note 79, at 37–39.
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arrangement is worth striving for. Battered women, in their somber
and tragic life tale, face their destiny bare-handed, while their own
reactions entail potentially catastrophic legal consequences. Hence,
this Paper prescribes a new defence: self-defence in circumstances of
domestic violence. This criminal liability exemption will more prop-
erly address the extreme circumstances whereby the accused act in
cases of ongoing, serial, domestic abuse. The proposed amendment
would allow defendants to plead self-defence in circumstances of
domestic violence and receive the protection of criminal law. The re-
quirement of retreat, reasonableness, and immediacy in the suggested
defence will more appropriately answer and address the unique cir-
cumstantial characteristics of domestic violence.
Before the details of the proposal are elaborated, it is worth men-
tioning that the wording of the proposal uses the masculine form
solely for reasons of fairness and equality. In spite of the fact that
statistically the majority of victims of domestic violence are women,
the defence should, in all fairness, be applied to anyone acting under
such circumstances, regardless of gender. The suggested amend-
ment is in line with the current trends of the Israeli legislator (the
broadening of the self-defence doctrine), and legislative reforms in
developed nations that relate to the application of self-defence in
circumstances of abuse and domestic violence.90
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE PENAL CODE
Penal Code Bill (Amendment—Self Defence in Circumstances
of Domestic Violence), 2011-5770.91
Inserting Section 34(J)(2):
1. In the Penal Code, 1977-5737, after Section 34(J)(1)
insert:
“Self Defence in Circumstances of Domestic Violence”
34(J)(2). (a) No person shall be criminally liable for an
act necessary to repel an attack in circum-
stances of domestic violence.
(b) When attacked under circumstances of
domestic violence, the person attacked shall be
90. See supra notes 75–102 and accompanying text.
91. Penal Code, 5737-1977, § 34(J)(1) (Isr.).
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deemed to have been in real and tangible dan-
ger to life or limb, unless proven otherwise.
(c) No person’s action shall be deemed unrea-
sonable in circumstances of domestic violence,
for failing to retreat from his place of residence.
(d) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not
apply if the act was clearly unreasonable, in
circumstances of domestic violence, to prevent
the injury.
(e) For these purposes, “Domestic Violence”
shall mean—violence directed at a person by
a family member.
(1) “Family Member”—as defined in the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,
1991-5751.
(2) (a) “Violence”—A serial and continu-
ous act which includes, but is not
limited to, one of the following:
i. Sexual Abuse
ii. Physical Abuse
iii. Psychological Abuse, which in-





d. Injury to Property
e. The exposure of a minor or
helpless person to violence
upon a member of his family
(b) Notwithstanding subsection
(2)(a) a single act of violence could
be deemed “Domestic Violence” by
reason of its extreme and degrading
nature.
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VI. EXPLANATORY REMARKS REGARDING THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Section 34(J)(2)(a) proposes to not impose criminal liability on
a person who committed an act to repel an attack in circumstances
of domestic violence. This proposition is in line with the current
legislative trend as expressed by Amendment No. 37 (which broad-
ened the Israeli doctrine of self-defence).92 It is also in line with the
“justification” 93 approach, according to which a person does not
incur criminal liability at all in circumstances in which he did not
perform an illegal act, but rather, performed a moral and justifiable
act.94 This approach differs from the “excuse” approach in the con-
text of battered women, whereby the mere defensive act is deemed
as unlawful.95
Though at the end of the judicial proceedings the defendant will
be excused from criminal liability for her “unlawful acts,” 96 such
acquittal in practice leaves the conviction standing with all the social
and emotional implications that go along with such, even when
sentenced to no actual punishment. The acquittal is intrinsically
intertwined with attributing flaws to the battered women’s morality
and reasonableness.97 Thus, though it is true that the doctrine of
92. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
93. See Boaz Sangero, Self Defence in Criminal Law, Jerusalem, 29–50, 58–66 (2000)
(explaining the differences between the approach of justif ication and excuse).
94. See, e.g., B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach
to Justifying Lethal Self-Defense By Battered Women, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 169,
177–82 (1991).
95. On the advantages of the doctrine of “excuse” in relation to abused women ac-
cused of attacking their husbands, see Giora Fletcher, Self Defence Of Abused Woman,
Plilim F, 1997, 65, 86–88; Leon Shelef, From Criminal Killing To Legal Defence, Plilim
F, 1997, 89, 110–13; Sangero, supra note 93, at 403–05; Rosen, supra note 37, at 31.
96. The excuse approach deals with the question of whether the abused women are
indeed responsible for the unlawful act they committed. According to this approach, the
excuse is ingrained in the claim that the unlawful acts committed by these women are
not attributable to them but to the special condition in which they were placed when
they committed them. See Sangero, supra note 93, at 30, 59.
97. The attribution of a primary flaw to the battered woman is intertwined with the
basic assumption that her act of self-defence was not justif ied and appropriate under the
circumstances. Hence, the application of the “excuse” doctrine to these women intrinsically
attributes to them a pathological deviation from the standard of the reasonable person.
Though this attributed deviation does not go as far as mental illness, it is certainly per-
ceived as a temporal or permanent harm to their ability to make a rational and reasonable
decision. In fact, the justif ication approach contains a latent claim with regard to cir-
cumstances of domestic violence as causing a permanent and fundamental flaw in the
ability to perform autonomous and intelligent choices (as opposed to reasonable people that
can be responsible for their actions and choose appropriate and rational behaviour even
in cases of extreme distress). See A.M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20,
37–47, 55–57 (1994); R.F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony,
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“excuse” sets abused women free, their escape from physical incar-
ceration is at the price of being tagged and bound in the stereotype
of a flawed human being.98 Concomitantly and inadvertently, such
acquittals entrench stigmatic gender-based perceptions which further
fabricate the subordination and discrimination of women in general,
and of battered women in particular.99 An additional disadvantage
should be added to these shortcomings: an acquittal by reason of
excuse has a limited scope of application since it can only be per-
sonal, and can only be granted to the victim of the abuse himself. Such
limited scope of application could spell grave legal consequences for
anyone rushing to help a battered woman whilst risking a murder
conviction and a lengthy custodial sentence.
The doctrine of “justification,” on the other hand, does not attri-
bute any guilt, unreasonableness, or wrongdoing,100 and obviously
no unlawfulness to the abused woman’s defending actions. Under
the approach of this proposal, a repelling act in circumstances of
domestic violence is a priori justifiable and does not require an ex-
emption from criminal liability or punishment.101 As such, the doctrine
of justification would allow the application of an appropriate crimi-
nal defence to third parties who rush to the aide of the victim,102 as
well as appropriate protection to the likes of Shuki Baso and Shakhar
Hadad, who were sentenced to ten years in prison for killing their
father who abused their mother over an extended period of time.103
and the Distinction between Justification and Excuse, UNIV. OF ILL. L. REV. 45, 92–93,
95–97 (1994); Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 219 (2002).
98. See Coughlin, supra note 97, at 2 (“Though actors who do not possess the capacity
for responsible conduct may not be punished criminally, the decision to excuse them
constitutes a negative statement about their status as moral agents, which may expose
them to supervision by civil authorities.” ) (emphasis added).
99. See id. at 7, 14, 28, 54, 62, 67, 87–88, 92 (regarding the article’s elaborate dis-
cussion).
100. See Burke, supra note 97, at 250–54 (regarding an approach that analyzes and
def ines the behaviour and choices of an abused woman as rational and reasonable be-
haviour both subjectively and objectively).
101. Id.
102. See Burke, supra note 97, at 232–33.
103. CrimA (TA) 416/93 State of Israel v. Shuki Beso, PM 54(3) 281, 282–83 (1994)
(Isr.); CrimA 4419/95 State of Israel v. Shachar Hadad 752(2) PD (1995) (Isr.). It is true
that under the existing legislation (adopted as mentioned following these cases) the
sentence of a family member can be reduced but this is just a reduced sentence and not
an acquittal. Even if the proposed reform of homicide offences is to be adopted (according
to which the criminal liability of victims of prolonged abuse shall be reduced), these de-
fendants would still be convicted of manslaughter and sent to lengthy custodial sentences.
Moreover, the reform (that bases the suggested clause on the doctrine of excuse) applies
this defence solely to the victim himself or to a family member of the victim, but does not
extend such defence to everyone else.
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Some would claim that such a polemic on the question of the appro-
priate doctrine (“excuse” or “justification”) is meaningless, as under
both the accused is acquitted and freed.104 However, since the differ-
ence between the two kinds of acquittals has dire legal and practical
consequences, the distinction between the two is worthy in both the
academic sphere, as well as in practical, legal, and moral.
Secondly, Section 34 (J)(2)(b) suggests a presumption that in
circumstances of domestic violence a real and deadly threat exists. As
stated, a similar non-rebuttal presumption was suggested in Ver-
sion A of the Bill that became Amendment 98105 (the castle-defence),
and was included in the legal interpretation undertaken by the Court
when applying this defence in the Dromi case.106 This proposal sug-
gests a milder approach which affords an opportunity to rebut the
presumption by use of the wording: “unless proven otherwise.”107
Thirdly, the proposal suggests that the “immediacy”108 require-
ment be repealed from the version of self-defence in circumstances of
domestic violence. The present burden imposed on female defendants
to prove that the attack had an element of immediacy as a precondi-
tion for the application of the exemption, set down in Section 34(J)
of the Penal Code, is far divorced from the actual realities of the
lives of victims of domestic abuse.109 Therefore, the proposed version
creates a negative arrangement in relation to the immediacy compo-
nent. Accordingly, the absence of this element is not a legal lacuna,
but rather an intentional silence on behalf of the legislator. The imme-
diacy component not being required under these circumstances
104. See R.A. Rosen, supra note 41, at 408–09 (claiming, for example, that the insis-
tence on distinguishing between justif ication and excuse in this context is: “[M]uch ado
about very little.” ). Similarly, Kit Kinports claims: “[A]lthough the distinction between
justif ication and excuse may have some academic or theoretical importance, it makes no
practical difference to the defendant whether the jury determines that her use of defensive
force was justified or excused. In either case, she is acquitted and goes free.” Kit Kinports,
Defending Battered Women’s Self Defence Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 460, (1988).
105. In the relevant clause of version A of Amendment No. 98 it was proposed: (b) “In the
event that the assault was an intrusion or entry to a residence with the intention of com-
mitting an offence, the person assaulted, and any person with him, shall be deemed to have
been in real danger of injury to life or limb, unless proven otherwise.” Draft Bill Amending
the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 98 (Isr.).
106. In the judicial interpretation of Amendment No. 98, the court read in to the words
of the amendment also the presumption of real danger, even though it was not expressly
approved by the Israeli legislator. See CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD
(2009) (Isr.).
107. See supra Section V.
108. The requirement of immediacy appears as follows: “an act that was immediately
necessary,” current wording of the Penal Code Section 34(J) (current self-defence clause)
and Section 34(J)(1) (castle-defence as per Dromi Amendment); Draft Bill Amending the
Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 98 (Isr.).
109. Penal Code, 5737-1977, § 34(J)(1) (Isr.).
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would mean that the legislator pondered the immediacy require-
ment and decided to waive it in circumstances of domestic abuse.
Under the proposed version, the courts will be impeded from apply-
ing the traditional case law requirements in relation to the element
of immediacy in circumstances of domestic violence. A similar ap-
proach was also taken by the State of Victoria, Australia (there the
requirements of immediacy and proportionality for the application
of the self-defence privilege in domestic violence circumstances were
repealed),110 and by several states in the United States (such as
Utah111 and Kentucky) that legislated that evidence of an abusive
relationship is sufficient to prove the existence of immediacy in
the context of domestic violence.112 Compatible provisions exist in
other states: Arkansas determined that the mere threat of the
continuation of the pattern of abuse in circumstances of domestic
violence was sufficient to justify the use of force in self-defence;113
Georgia determined that evidence of domestic violence can be admit-
ted in support of a claim to self-defence;114 and Maryland115 and
110. Victoria Crimes (homicide) act, 9AH, (2005) (“ . . . for the purposes of murder,
defensive homicide or manslaughter, in circumstances where family violence is alleged
a person may believe, and may have reasonable grounds for believing, that his or her
conduct is necessary . . . . even if—(c) he or she is responding to a harm that is not
immediate; or (d) his or her response involves the use of force in excess of the force in-
volved in the harm or threatened harm.”).
111. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(5) (West 2010) (“In determining imminence or rea-
sonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any
of the following factors: . . . (d) the other’s prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties’ relationship.”) (emphasis added).
112. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.010(3) (West 2006) (“ ‘Imminent’ means impending
danger, and, in the context of domestic violence and abuse as defined by KRS 403.720,
belief that danger is imminent can be inferred from a past pattern of repeated serious
abuse.” ) (emphasis added).
113. ARKANSAS CODE ANN. § 5-2-607 (West 2015) (“imminently about to victimize the
person . . . from the continuation of a pattern of domestic abuse.”).
114. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d) (West 2001) (“In a prosecution for murder or
manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense a justif ication provided by subsection
(a) of this Code section, the defendant, in order to establish the defendant’s reasonable
belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary, may be permitted
to offer: (1) Relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family
violence or child abuse committed by the deceased, as such acts are described in Code
Sections 19-13-1 and 19-15-1, respectively; and (2) [r]elevant expert testimony regarding
the condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the offense, including those
relevant facts and circumstances relating to the family violence or child abuse that are
the bases of the expert’s opinion.”) (emphasis added).
115. MD. CODE ANN. § 10-916 (West 1996) (“(a)(1) In this section the following words
have the meanings indicated. (2) ‘Battered Spouse Syndrome’ means the psychological
condition of a victim of repeated physical and psychological abuse by a spouse, former
spouse, cohabitant, or former cohabitant which is also recognized in the medical and sci-
entific community as the ‘Battered Woman’s Syndrome’. . . . (b) Notwithstanding evidence
that the defendant was the f irst aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to retreat at
the time of the alleged offense, when the defendant raises the issue that the defendant
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Louisiana116 promulgated that the mere presentation of testimony
of an abusive relationship (between the defender and the person
against whom force was used) suffices for the application of the self-
defence exception.117
Other states in the United States adopted a similar approach
by minimizing the requirement of immediacy so that the self-de-
fence exception could be granted in cases whereby the danger is not
immediate (and possibly less certain), as “imminent” danger.118 Thus,
states in the United States such as Louisiana,119 Illinois,120 Kansas,121
was, at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from the Battered Spouse Syndrome as
a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for
which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit for the purpose of explaining
the defendant’s motive or state of mind, or both, at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense: (1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse of the defendant per-
petrated by an individual who is the victim of a crime for which the defendant has been
charged; and (2) Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome.” ) (emphasis added).
116. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. ART. 404(2) (2009) (“provided further that when the accused
pleads self-defense and there is a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and
the accused and the accused lived in a familial or intimate relationship such as, but not
limited to, the husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage relationship, it shall not be
necessary to f irst show a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim in
order to introduce evidence of the dangerous character of the victim, including specific
instances of conduct and domestic violence; and further provided that an expert’s opinion
as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on the accused’s state of mind is admissible;
or . . . (2) In the absence of evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part
of the victim at the time of the offense charged, evidence of the victim’s prior threats
against the accused or the accused’s state of mind as to the victim’s dangerous character
is not admissible; provided that when the accused pleads self-defense and there is a
history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused and the accused lived
in a familial or intimate relationship such as, but not limited to, the husband-wife,
parent-child, or concubinage relationship, it shall not be necessary to f irst show a hostile
demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim in order to introduce evidence of the
dangerous character of the victim, including specif ic instances of conduct and domestic
violence; and further provided that an expert’s opinion as to the effects of the prior
assaultive acts on the accused’s state of mind is admissible.” ) (emphasis added).
117. Even in the absence of testimony as to a concrete act that necessitated the use
of force in self-defence. See MD. CODE ANN. § 10-916(3) (West 1996); LA. CODE EVID. ANN.
ART. 404(2) (2009).
118. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 97, at 226; Schopp et al., supra note 97, at 64–70.
119. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2014) (“A homicide is justifiable: (1) When committed in
self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his
life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from
that danger.”) (emphasis added).
120. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1 (West 2014) (“Use of force in defense of person[:] (a) A
person is justif ied in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he rea-
sonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such
other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” ) (emphasis added).
121. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5222 (West 2011) (“[D]efense of a person; no duty to retreat.
(a) A person is justif ied in the use of force against another when and to the extent it
appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is
necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other’s imminent use of
unlawful force.” ) (emphasis added).
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Utah,122 and Georgia123 moderated the requirement of immediacy in
the self-defence doctrine in general (and not solely within the context
of domestic abuse) by replacing the requirement of immediate danger
with “imminent” danger.124 Some states (such as Idaho,125 Washing-
ton,126 New Mexico,127 and Nevada128) even reduced the requirement
of immediacy further by converting it into a requirement that some
kind of a plan to commit an offence or injury to the person, exists.129
Fourthly, in Section 34(J)(2)(c) it is proposed to set a rule that
a person attacked in circumstances of domestic violence is not required
to retreat.130 The amendment states that, in so far as it is an attack
perpetrated in circumstances of domestic violence, non-retreat shall
not detract from the evaluation of whether reasonableness is met,
as required by Section 34(O) of the Penal Code.131 Such a rule exists
in various states in the United States, under which there is no
122. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (West 2010) (“(1)(a) A person is justified in threatening
or using force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably be-
lieves that force or a threat of force is necessary to defend the person or a third person
against another person’s imminent use of unlawful force.” ) (emphasis added).
123. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (West 2001) (“(a) A person is justif ied in threatening or
using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person
against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” ) (emphasis added).
124. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2014); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1 (West 2014); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5222 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-21 (West 2001).
125. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4009 (West 1972) (“Homicide is also justif iable when
committed by any person in either of the following cases: . . . 3. When committed in the
lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress or
servant of such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to
commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design
being accomplished.” ) (emphasis added).
126. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.020(3) (West 1986) (“Whenever used by a
party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or
attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person . . . in case the force is not
more than is necessary.”) (emphasis added).
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7 (West 1963) (“Homicide is justif iable when committed
by any person in any of the following cases . . . when committed in the lawful defense of
himself or of another and when there is a reasonable ground to believe a design exists to
commit a felony or to do some great personal injury against such person or another, and
there is imminent danger that the design will be accomplished.” ) (emphasis added).
128. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.160 (West 1993) (“Homicide is also justif iable when
committed . . . [i]n the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent,
child, brother or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to
commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person,
and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished.” ) (emphasis added).
129. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4009 (West 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7 (West 1963);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.160 (West 1993); see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.020(3)
(West 1986).
130. See supra Section V.
131. Penal Code, 5737-1977, § 34(O) (Isr.).
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requirement of retreat for any unlawful attack whatsoever, whether
committed in private and/or closed spaces (i.e, home and car), or in
public and open spaces.132
As mentioned, the repeal of the duty to retreat already exists in
Israeli case law, as held in the Dromi case.133 Thus, the insertion of
such a rule in the context of domestic violence would be in line with
the requirements of justice, the judicial interpretation in the Dromi
case, and relevant legislation in the field of domestic abuse.134
Fifthly, Section 34(J)(2)(d) proposes to broaden the condition of
reasonableness when applying the privilege of self-defence, so that
in circumstances of domestic abuse only an act that was clearly un-
reasonable would pull the rug from under the application of the
defence.135 In circumstances of domestic abuse, perhaps it would be
appropriate to mold the interpretation of the “clearly unreasonable”
criterion not only to the length and patterns of violence, but also to
evidence of authorities’ (social services and/or enforcement) helpless-
ness to save the accused, who was the victim of continued abuse.136
This way, the abused woman’s choices, perceptions, and conduct may
be weighed and examined vis-à-vis the specific and general function-
ing of the social services and enforcement authorities.137
132. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2014) (“. . . A person [who is not engaged in
an unlawful activity and] who is attacked [in any other place named by the statute where
he or she has a right to be] has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her
ground and use or threaten to use force, including deadly force if he or she [reasonably
believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or her-
self or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony].”) (emphasis added). Simi-
lar legislation exists in other states in the U.S. that specif ically determine that there is
no duty to retreat in order to apply the self-defence privilege. These are termed: “stand
your ground laws” and exist in states such as Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. 
See Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws and Homicides 1,4
n. 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), http://www.flgov
.com/wp-content/uploads/citsafety/20120913_secondchance1.pdf.
133. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 1991-5751 (specif ically Section
2 under which restraining orders may be issued to family member assailants, seen in
circumstances of communal residence and shared property).
135. See supra Section V.
136. Concerning the necessity to consider the authorities’ shortcomings in handling
and preventing domestic violence as objective evidence with regard to the reasonableness
of the conduct of abused women, see Shelef, supra note 95, at 92–94; Burke, supra note
97, at 216–17, 269; Schopp et al., supra note 97, at 105–07.
137. Within this context, taking no action such as complaint to the welfare or enforce-
ment authorities (for protection and assistance in the face of continuing violence), could
be perhaps interpreted as a “clearly unreasonable” conduct which could pull the rug from
under the application of the proposed criminal exception. Even though the castle-defence
(Dromi Amendment) did not expressly relate to complaining to the state authorities (or
to their shortcomings) as evidence of objective reasonableness required to uphold a claim
of self-defence, such recognition is implied from the legislative proposal in relation to the
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As mentioned, the proposed moderation of the reasonableness
requirement relieves the current provisions in Section 34(O) of the
Penal Code which determine that an unreasonable act suffices to
deny any application of the defence.138 Such reduced requirement of
reasonableness with regard to domestic violence already exists in
states such as Arizona.139 In circumstances of domestic violence, an
objective test is used to measure reasonableness for self-defence, but
is subjected to the perspective of the person who is under such cir-
cumstances.140 As already noted, such moderated requirements
already exist in the Israeli Penal Code (in the context of the castle-
defence Amendment),141 and there is no reason to avoid a similar
approach in circumstances of domestic violence (if only for reasons
of legislative harmony).
Sixthly, Section 34(J)(2)(e) proposes a definition of circum-
stances of domestic violence. The proposal allows for two optional
versions: a version which includes subsection (e) which contains a
legal definition of domestic violence (with reference to the various
different components of abuse which have not heretofore been formally
protection of the agricultural sector which preceded this Amendment, as it is from the
debates in the context of the Amendment itself. See Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code
(Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH (Knesset) No. 98 (Isr). In the debates con-
cerning the Amendment, claims were heard both by supporters of the amendment and
by those opposing it, regarding the absence of the state and its authorities from enforcing
the law in the protection of the agricultural sector. See The Parliamentary Debates
regarding Amendment Bill No. 98 (June 24, 2008). Recognition of the relevance of such
evidence for granting the objective reasonableness required to uphold a claim of self-
defence was clearly expressed in the Dromi case verdict. Intentionally, the verdict starts
with a circumstantial description of a saga of ‘survival’, whereby the accused stood
barehanded against and amidst consecutive and repetitive daily larceny and robbery in
his solitary ranch. A literal reading of the verdict eventually implies that the narrative
of “a long chain of repetitive violent events that were not eradicated by the law enforce-
ment authorities despite many complaints by the accused” was in fact the legal anchor
for the application of reasonableness to actions, which culminated with his acquittal on
the grounds of the castle-defence exception. CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi
PD (2009) (Isr.).
138. Penal Code, 5737-1977, § 34(O) (Isr.).
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-415 (“If there have been past acts of domestic violence
as defined in § 13-3601, subsection A against the defendant by the victim, the state of
mind of a reasonable person under §§ 13-404, 13-405 and 13-406 shall be determined
from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of those past acts of
domestic violence.”)
140. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 97, at 220–21. Unlike the general standard of “the
reasonable man,” accepted in Israeli statute and case law.
141. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5768-2008, HH
(Knesset) No. 98 (Isr.) (Subsection B states that the defence would apply even if the
accused committed an action that was unreasonable in the circumstances, provided that
it was not a “clearly unreasonable” action, or (b) “The provisions of subsection (a) shall
not apply if—(1) the act was clearly unreasonable, in the circumstances, to repel the in-
truder or person so entering.”).
246 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:219
and literally expressed in legislation), and a version without subsec-
tion (e) which would in practice leave the definition and interpretation
of domestic violence to case law, as has been done in Israel thus
far.142 The proposed optional clause defining domestic violence is
based on the version of the Act adopted by the Australian state of
Victoria,143 and takes a similar expansionary view on the definition
of domestic violence. Thus, the section includes not only physical and
sexual abuse, but also psychological abuse in its many forms (intimi-
dation, harassment, verbal abuse, damage to property, etc.). The defi-
nition also includes the mere exposure of a minor to violence directed
at a family member (even if the violence was not directed specifically
towards the minor).144 Under the proposed clause, such exposure to
violence constitutes direct and severe emotional injury to the minor,
and is therefore regarded as domestic violence for all intents and
purposes. Thus, the proposed self-defence would have also applied
to defendants such as Shachar Hadad and Shuki Baso, who were not
only beaten up themselves, but also witnessed their father’s horren-
dous abuse of their mother for many excruciating years.145 Such a
broadened definition of domestic violence is all the more needed in
Israel since current Israeli legislation is especially harsh on such
defendants as under Section 300(a)(1). There is no requirement of
“premeditation” in order to convict a descendant for the murder of his
ancestor.146 Such an approach would therefore do appropriate justice
to these unique circumstances of domestic abuse.147
142. See, e.g., CrimA 4596/98 Mrs. X (Plonit) v. State of Israel (25)(1) PD (2000) (Isr.).
143. Crimes (homicide) act 2005, 9AH (“ ‘family violence’, in relation to a person, means
violence against that person by a family member; Violence means—(a) physical abuse
(b) sexual abuse (c) psychological abuse (which need not involve actual or threatened
physical abuse), including but not limited to—(i) intimidation; (ii) harassment; (iii) dam-
age to property; (iv) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse (v)in
relation to a child—(A) causing or allowing the child to see or hear the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a person by a family member; or (B) putting the child, or allowing
the child to be put, at real risk of seeing or hearing that abuse occurring. (5) Without
limiting the definition of ‘violence’ in sub-section (4)-(a) a single act may amount to abuse
for the purposes of that definition; (b) a number of acts that form part of a pattern of
behaviour may amount to abuse for that purpose, even though some or all of those acts,
when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial.” ).
144. Id.
145. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
146. Draft Bill Amending the Penal Code (Legislative Amendments), 5755-1995, HH
No. 44, § 300 (Isr.).
147. According to the wording of this section, which originated in the Ottoman legal code
enacted in Israel prior to the British conquest, then Palestinian, a person shall be convicted
of murder: “who maliciously caused the death of his father, mother, grandfather or
grandmother by a prohibited act or omission . . . .” Penal Code, 5737-1977, § 300(a) (Isr.).
On this aggravating circumstance, see, for example, the words of the Justices at paragraph
five of the Shachar Hadad verdict, who was charged with killing his father after long
years of the latter’s abusing his mother. CrimA 4419/95 State of Israel v. Shachar Hadad
752(2) PD ¶ 5 (1995) (Isr.) In the verdict, the Justices noted that formally Shachar
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CONCLUSION
This Article argues for a change of the socio-legal stance in re-
lation to the right to self-defence of family members exposed to
severe and ongoing abuse. Israeli society has lately shown its willing-
ness to change the doctrine of self-defence with regard to the castle-
defence (as expressed recently in the “Dromi Act” Amendment).148
Therefore, a corresponding change is called for in order to give peo-
ple whose spouses abuse them with all cruelty the right to fend for
themselves. In light of the fact that the physical scene of abuse is
none other than the victim’s home (as well as their own symbolical,
mental and emotional “castle”) such harmonizing legal change is all
the more called for. The change argued for is admittedly an immense
legal challenge in light of the remarkably fundamentally masculine
model built into the current doctrine of self-defence in the Israeli
Penal Code, but all the more so, it is a just and a fair one.
As hinted by the title of this Article and to paraphrase Woolf’s
landmark inquiry into women’s position in society, A Room of One’s
Own, the time has come to accommodate a similar socio-legal space
for a doctrine of self defence for abused women in their homes.149
Such legal space would literally and practically demand the adjust-
ment of the current requirements set forth for the application of the
self-defence exception, to women in circumstances of domestic abuse.
Aligning with the current castle-defence doctrine introduced to the
Israeli legal scene, it is time to let women feel safe and secure in
their own premises and defend themselves in their own “castle.” In
other words, the time has come to afford women with “a castle” that
is “of their own” not only literally and symbolically, but first and
foremost, legally and figuratively. As has been argued herein, amend-
ments similar to the proposed amendment already exist in certain
western nations, and there is no reason why Israel, of all places,
should avoid this important, just, and required change.
committed the offence of murder for all intents and purposes. Id. (“This is the place to
mention, that according to the facts as related by the Accused himself in his testimony
to us, the offence the Accused committed is murder. In the case of patricide, not only does
one not need prove premeditation and the mere intentional killing of a father constitutes
the offence of murder (see Section 300a(1) of the Penal Code 1977-5737), but in this case,
the Accused testif ied to us that he committed the act of killing, knowing full well what
he was doing and understanding the consequences thereof.” ).
148. CrimA (BS) 1010/07 State of Israel v. Dromi PD (2009) (Isr.).
149. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A Room of One’s Own, in THE VIRGINIA WOOLF READER 168, 169
(1984).

